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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-1370 
 ___________ 
 
IN RE: DIET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE/FENFLURAMINE/ 
DEXFENFLURAMINE) 
PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION 
 
Nicholas Napora, 
                                Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-99-cv-20593, MDL No. 2-16-md-01203) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 28, 2014 
 
 Before:  SMITH, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  January 29, 2014) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Nicholas Napora appeals from the order of the District Court denying his claim for 
benefits from the AHP Settlement Trust (“Trust”).  We will affirm. 
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I. 
 Napora is a member of the certified settlement class who seeks benefits under the 
Diet Drugs Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”).  
We have previously discussed the background of this litigation, the relevant terms of the 
Settlement Agreement and the relevant medical issues at some length, and we need not 
do so here.  See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs, 543 F.3d 179, 181-90 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 Napora filed his claim with the Trust seeking $590,261 in benefits under Matrix 
A-1, Level II of the Settlement Agreement.  That claim required him to show a 
reasonable medical basis for concluding that he suffers from, inter alia, mitral 
regurgitation of at least a moderate level.  To that end, he submitted a November 9, 2002 
echocardiogram together with a “Green Form” in which Dr. David M. Gonzalez attested 
that the echocardiogram showed moderate mitral regurgitation. 
 The Trust referred Napora’s claim to an independent auditing cardiologist, Dr. 
Vincent L. Sorrell.  Dr. Sorrell concluded that there was no reasonable medical basis for 
Dr. Gonzalez’s finding of moderate mitral regurgitation and that Dr. Gonzalez had based 
it on an inaccurate measurement.  On that basis, the Trust issued a post-audit 
determination denying Napora’s claim.  Napora contested the determination and 
submitted three additional physician reports.  One was a second report from Dr. 
Gonzalez, who did not address Dr. Sorrell’s criticism but who qualified his opinion by 
stating that Napora’s echocardiogram shows “mild to borderline moderate” mitral 
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regurgitation.  The two other reports were from Dr. Abdou El-Hendy, who reviewed 
Napora’s November 9 echocardiogram, and Dr. Juan J. Vasquez Bauza, who reviewed a 
subsequent echocardiogram taken on August 9, 2004.  Dr. El-Hendy opined that 
Napora’s November 9 echocardiogram revealed only mild mitral regurgitation, and Dr. 
Bauza opined that Napora’s subsequent echocardiogram revealed only a trace amount.  
The Trust affirmed the denial of Napora’s claim. 
Napora contested that determination as well, so the Trust applied to the District 
Court for an order requiring him to show cause why his claim should be paid.  The 
District Court issued the order and referred the matter to a Special Master, who appointed 
Dr. Gary J. Vigilante as an independent technical advisor.  Dr. Vigilante issued a report 
agreeing with the Trust that there is no reasonable basis to conclude that Napora suffers 
from moderate mitral regurgitation.  The Special Master then forwarded the record to the 
District Court for review, along with a declaration that Napora submitted from Dr. Dean 
G. Karalis.  Dr. Karalis too opined that Napora’s November 9 echocardiogram revealed 
“at most mild” regurgitation.  The District Court affirmed the Trust’s denial of Napora’s 
claim after reviewing this evidence, and Napora appeals. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See In re Diet Drugs, 543 F.3d at 
184 n.10.  “We review a District Court’s exercise of its equitable authority to administer 
and implement a class action settlement for abuse of discretion.”  Id.  “‘[T]o find an 
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abuse of discretion the District Court’s decision must rest on ‘a clearly erroneous finding 
of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.’”  Id. 
(citation omitted).   
 In this case, the District Court thoroughly reviewed the record and concluded that 
Napora has not met his burden to show a reasonable basis for concluding that he suffers 
from at least moderate mitral regurgitation.  See id. at 181.  That finding was not clearly 
erroneous.  Indeed, of the six physicians who reviewed Napora’s echocardiograms, only 
Dr. Gonzalez opined that Napora suffers from moderate mitral regurgitation, and even he 
qualified his opinion on further review by opining that Napora’s mitral regurgitation is 
“mild to borderline moderate.”  
 Napora does not directly challenge the District Court’s assessment of the record.  
Instead, he argues that someone manipulated his echocardiogram (apparently the one 
taken on November 9) by inserting “jets” and that the reviewing physicians reached the 
conclusions they did only because of those “fraudulent inserts.”  Napora further argues 
that he was unable to rebut these physicians’ opinions because his former counsel (on 
whom he appears to blame the alleged fraud) has not provided him with certain 
information and because the District Court denied various motions that Napora filed to 
compel discovery. 
 As the Trust argues, there is no evidence to support Napora’s bald assertions that 
his echocardiograms were manipulated or that such manipulation tainted the reviewing 
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physicians’ conclusions.  To the contrary, although an issue regarding manipulated 
echocardiograms has indeed arisen during the administration of the Settlement 
Agreement, that issue involved echocardiograms that were manipulated to overstate class 
members’ level of mitral regurgitation and thus to make bad claims appear good, not vice 
versa.  (ECF No. 2110, Pretrial Order No. 5517.)   
 Nor can we say that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Napora’s 
requests for discovery.  As the Trust argues, discovery is prohibited during show cause 
proceedings by Rule 41 of the Rules for the Audit of Matrix Compensation Claims, 
which provides that “[n]either the Trust nor the Claimant shall be permitted to conduct 
any discovery relating to [a show cause] Application.”  The District Court approved that 
rule and the other rules governing its review of contested audit determinations in Pretrial 
Order 2807, entered March 26, 2003.  Napora has not challenged the validity of that rule, 
so we have no occasion to consider whether it is subject to challenge at this stage.   
 In any event, Napora was fully aware of the basis for the Trust’s denial of his 
claim and had the opportunity, of which he availed himself, to have an additional 
echocardiogram, have his echocardiograms read by additional physicians, and present 
those physicians’ opinions to the District Court.  If there were any basis for concluding 
that either of Napora’s echocardiograms were manipulated, or that the manipulation 
resulted in an understatement of his level of mitral regurgitation, nothing prevented him 
from submitting a declaration from one of his reviewing physicians to that effect.  
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Finally, the alleged conduct of Napora’s former counsel, on which we express no 
opinion, does not relieve Napora of his burden of proof or otherwise state a basis for 
relief on appeal in this civil action. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
